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DAVID ANDERS*
Criminalization of Corporate Law'
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE GRACIOUS INTRODUCTION. I appreciate the op-
portunity to come speak to you today to give you my thoughts about the prosecu-
tion of corporate fraud cases.
In 2002, I ended up in the middle of a wave of corporate fraud prosecutions. In
particular, I was involved in the WorldCom prosecution from the beginning of the
. Mr. Anders is Counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz. Prior to entering private practice, Mr.
Anders was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York. Mr. Anders has also
served as an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Fordham University School of Law. © David Anders 2007.
1. These remarks were made at the University of Maryland School of Law's Roundtable on the
Criminalization of Corporate Law over a year ago, in April 2006. Since that time, the criminal enforcement
landscape has evolved considerably. While there are still significant incentives for companies to cooperate with
government prosecutors, 2006 saw the beginning of a push-back against what have come to be seen as overly
aggressive government enforcement policies and practices. In June, in the United States v. Stein case, Judge
Kaplan in the Southern District of New York held that the Thompson Memo's provision on advancing counsel
fees, and the actions of the U.S. Attorney's Office in implementing those provisions, violated Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights of the defendants. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A month later, the Judge also found
that the proffer statements of two former KPMG employees had been obtained in violation of their Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination due to KPMG's use of economic threats, deliberately precipitated
by the government to coerce the proffer statements in question. United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
On December 12, 2006, in a memo from Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, the Department of
Justice issued new guidance on the prosecution of corporations that superseded the Thompson Memo. The
new policy continues to require prosecutors to consider a corporation's voluntary disclosure and willingness to
cooperate in determining whether to seek an indictment. However, the policy states that corporate waiver of
privilege is not a prerequisite to a finding that a company has cooperated. Moreover, the McNulty Memo
restricts government requests for such waivers to those cases where there is a "legitimate need" for the
privileged information, not simply because it is desirable or convenient for prosecutors. With respect to
advancement of fees, the policy essentially codifies the decision in United States v. Stein and states that
prosecutors should not take into account whether a company is advancing attorney's fees to its employees or
agents.
In addition, there is federal legislation pending-the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007-
that, if passed, would prohibit federal prosecutors and civil enforcement lawyers from requesting that
corporations produce any privileged communications. The legislation would also bar federal prosecutors from
considering a corporation's decision to waive privilege or advance fees to employees in determining whether to
bring criminal charges.
Although the landscape has changed, corporations are still under great pressure to cooperate with
government prosecutors and to waive privilege. Indeed, the McNulty Memo specifically provides that
prosecutors may always "favorably consider" a corporation's agreement to waive privilege in response to the
government's request. Moreover, nothing in the past year has changed the fundamental principle that
companies will be liable, in virtually all cases, for criminal misconduct by their employees. Accordingly,
prosecutors will continue to have significant leverage over corporations, and corporations will, in turn,
continue to have great incentives to be cooperative.
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investigation when the scandal broke in June of 2002 until the government resolved
the investigation of the company in September of 2005. As you might imagine, a lot
happened during that time.
While it was tempting, given the topic of the symposium, simply to just tell war
stories about everything that happened during that process, that is really not ap-
propriate, as the appeal of Ebbers' conviction is still pending.2 So I am going to talk
generally about corporate fraud prosecutions from the perspective of a former
prosecutor. In particular, I am going to focus on the role that the corporate entity
plays in a corporate fraud prosecution. That topic will let me talk about the entire
scope of a corporate fraud prosecution from beginning to end, because, as you will
see, the corporate entity itself plays a role in every step of a corporate fraud prose-
cution. And whether the company really intends it or not, in the government's
view, the ultimate purpose of its role is to help the government convict its former
employees. There is a role in this process for the defense attorneys who represent
corporations and I will mention that briefly. I will conclude with a few words on
what I think about the future of these cases.
Now, in many ways, a corporate fraud prosecution is really like any other case.
Prosecutors find out about a potential crime, and they gather evidence, look at
documents, talk to witnesses, and then make charging decisions. If they charge
somebody, then either there is a guilty plea or there is a trial, and if there is a
conviction, there is a sentencing.
What makes a corporate fraud prosecution a little bit different is that, in virtu-
ally every one of those stages, the corporate entity plays an important role in help-
ing the government. That may sound a little bit counterintuitive: Why should a
company help the government prove that its current or former employees commit-
ted a crime? The answer is that the company's own fate often rests on how much it
helps the government.
The name of the game in corporate fraud prosecutions now is cooperation.
Companies want to be viewed as good corporate citizens and being a good corpo-
rate citizen means helping the government.
This is a relatively new phenomenon. In the early 90's, this idea of corporate
cooperation first took hold. It was through such cases as the prosecutions of Ivan
Boesky3 and Michael Milken4 and some of the spin-offs of those cases, that the idea
of corporate cooperation began to develop. Prosecutors at my old office in the
Southern District of New York were able to get cooperation from the financial
2. Since the date of this speech, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
Ebbers' conviction and twenty-five year prison sentence. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
3. See Tim Metz & Michael W. Miller, Widening Scandal on Wall Street: Boesky's Rise and Fall Illustrate a
Compulsion to Profit by Getting Inside Track on Market, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 28.
4. See James B. Stewart, Scenes from a Scandal: The Secret World of Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 2, 1991, at BI.
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institutions that those and other people worked for, and those various financial
institutions strove to provide evidence to the government. The government obvi-
ously was happy to receive that evidence, and as a result was able to bring many
more cases. It was in that early to mid-90's period that this whole notion of corpo-
rate cooperation really became prevalent.
By now, the notion of corporate cooperation is firmly entrenched in our system.
In fact, it is part of Department of Justice policy. The document that I am referring
to, and many of you may be familiar with this, is called the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations,5 but it is more commonly known as the
Thompson Memo.6 It is an exceedingly important document.
When it comes to corporate cooperation, I will refer to the Thompson Memo
repeatedly. The memo is named for Larry Thompson who was the Deputy Attor-
ney General when this particular document was created in 2003. Actually, it was
just an update of the prior version of this policy, which was called the Holder
memo, for Eric Holder who was the Deputy Attorney General in 1999 when it was
created.
The Thompson Memo contains all the factors that prosecutors look at in deter-
mining whether to prosecute a corporation for the crimes of its employees.7 And
one of the most significant factors in practice, and certainly the one that gets the
most attention, is corporate cooperation.'
So what does that term mean, "cooperation?" Well, the best way to describe it is
to walk through the steps of a corporate fraud prosecution so you can see all the
ways that corporations can, and often do, cooperate with the government.
A company's efforts to cooperate may start even before prosecutors know about
potential wrongdoing. Many corporate investigations begin with the company self-
reporting the violation. Now, it is important to think about the significance of this.
When a company, through its lawyers, walks into a prosecutor's office and explains
that its own mid-level employee has committed a crime, the company is in effect
confessing to itself committing a crime. There is strict respondeat superior liability
for a company for the acts of its employees that are done in the course of their
business.
When a company reports to the government that its employee did something
wrong, it is confessing to its own liability. Yet companies do this all the time be-
cause they have learned that it is almost always better for the company to report the
5. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen. to Heads of Dep't. Components, U.S.
Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter
Thompson Memo].
6. See Sean R. Berry, Revised Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations: An Overview,
U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULLETIN (U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Office of Legal Educ.),
Nov. 2003, at 5-9, available at http://www.usdoj.govlusao/eousalfoia-readingroom/usab5106.pdf.
7. Thompson Memo, supra note 5, at § II.
8. Id. at § V1.
VOL. 2 NO. 1 2007
CRIMINALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW
wrongdoing itself rather than for the government to find out about it some other
way.
In fact, this notion of self-reporting is contained right in the Thompson Memo
itself. The Thompson Memo talks about whether a company timely and voluntarily
disclosed wrongdoing.9 Whether a company self-reported the violation is one of
the factors that the government will look at in deciding ultimately whether the
company itself should be charged criminally.' So right from the very beginning of
the process, companies know that if there is a problem, they need to bring it to the
government's attention.
Once that happens and the company has alerted the government to a possible
criminal act, a government investigation typically begins. There are a whole host of
ways that companies cooperate with the government in the course of investigations.
Many of those ways are described specifically in the Thompson Memo, and some of
them are the subject of significant controversy these days."
Now, in any corporate fraud, or really any fraud investigation, there are two
basic components to the investigation. There are the documents and there are the
witnesses. And companies have roles in cooperating in connection with both of
these components of an investigation.
First, the documents. This aspect of cooperation is not really controversial but it
is, in fact, probably the aspect of cooperation that most disrupts a company's day-
to-day business. Companies, particularly today, with electronic documents and
electronic discovery, face huge hurdles in gathering all potentially relevant docu-
ments in a corporate fraud investigation. Companies have to freeze normal docu-
ment retention policies; save backup tapes from computer servers; and restore old
e-mails. 12 And then there is the old-fashioned way of collecting documents: going
from office to office and collecting hard copy documents, which are just as impor-
tant in many cases. In a corporate fraud investigation, this process could involve
anywhere from a handful to tens or hundreds of employees.
Now, the process of gathering documents by itself is not unique to a corporate
fraud investigation. In any litigation, a company is responsible for preserving docu-
ments and then producing them, say, to an adversary in civil litigation. But there
are some important differences between producing documents in a civil case versus
producing documents as part of a criminal investigation.
First, the consequences of making a mistake are much different. When I say
making a mistake, I am not referring to a willful act, such as destroying docu-
ments-that conduct has criminal consequences no matter what the underlying
9. Id.
10. id.
11. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1170-84 (2006).
12. See Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171 (2006).
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case is about. Let us think about a company that just does not do a particularly
good job in preserving and producing documents. Well, the ramifications of that in
a civil case could be nothing or there could be certain disadvantages to the com-
pany in the civil proceedings. The worst-case scenario that we have heard of re-
cently is the case involving Ron Perelman's lawsuit against Morgan Stanley down in
Florida. 3 There, the court, in essence, directed a verdict against Morgan Stanley." I
do not have any personal knowledge of the relevant facts, but, based on public
reports, the document collection process was a debacle. As a result, Morgan Stan-
ley lost the case and owed a lot of money.'
In a criminal investigation, making mistakes of the magnitude that Morgan Stan-
ley reportedly made can have even worse ramifications. Prosecutors judge the way
that the documents are produced, and the effort that is put in by the company in
gathering documents. And mistakes, even inadvertent mistakes, sloppy types of
mistakes, as what reportedly happened in the Morgan Stanley case, can anger pros-
ecutors, lose the company cooperation credit, and take a company that much fur-
ther down the road toward being charged criminally.
So the consequences can be much greater in the criminal investigation. At least
in my experience, that is often why companies go to great lengths in the document
collection process in responding to subpoenas. I think it is safe to say that is not the
same attitude companies take in a civil litigation.
A second difference is the way that the documents are produced. In civil litiga-
tion, there are rules and companies produce the documents in a form prescribed by
those rules. Typically, no extra steps are taken in a regular civil case in producing
documents. By contrast, in criminal cases, companies often go above and beyond
what is required when producing documents. When I was a prosecutor, I often was
thoroughly impressed by how documents were physically produced: binders,
chronological order, by witness, by whatever the prosecutor wants. In fact, often
companies exceeded my expectations by thinking of different ways to format the
documents to reduce my burden. Frankly, that effort worked, as it showed that the
company was really cooperating, really trying to help the government. That is obvi-
ously a big difference from a civil case. I am pretty sure you will not see a party in a
civil case trying to impress its adversary by making the production of documents
more helpful than is required. So that is a second difference.
A third major difference that comes to mind is obviously a consequence of the
first two differences, and that is money. In a civil litigation, companies try to keep
13. See Susanne Craig, Moving the Market: Perelman to Press Morgan Stanley, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2005, at
C3.
14. See Susanne Craig, Perelman Wins Punitive Award of $850 Million, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2005, at Cl.
15. Id. Ultimately, however, Morgan Stanley did not have to pay the judgment. On appeal, the Florida
District Court of Appeal remanded the case with directions to enter judgment for the investment bank and
reversed both the compensatory and punitive damage awards. Morgan Stanley & Co, Inc. v. Coleman (Parent)
Holdings Inc., 32 Fla. L. Weekly D773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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the costs of document production down, or at least pay attention to it. In a crimi-
nal case, cost cannot prevent the company from producing documents that the
government requests. Companies sometimes need to pay whatever it costs to gather
documents and produce them in the form that the government requires, hoping
that, at the end of the day, it is money well spent because it helped avoid a criminal
charge.
I was just asking a colleague about how much it costs companies to produce
documents. My colleague reported that he was aware of a case where a company
paid $10 million to produce documents to the SEC. That sounds like a lot of
money because it is a lot of money. And yet, that is the mentality of some compa-
nies when it comes to producing documents in connection with a criminal or a
regulatory investigation under the Thompson Memo regime. It does not matter
what it costs, just cooperate and make the government happy.
In a corporate fraud investigation, almost all the relevant documents come from
the company. That fact leads to an interesting question: Who is actually doing the
investigation? It is rare that government agents will go into the corporate offices
and find the documents themselves. Often, in large, document-intensive cases, all
the documents come from the company through collections from its own employ-
ees, obviously in consultation with the government about search terms and other
methods of collecting relevant documents. But at the end of the day, it is the com-
pany's lawyers who get the documents first, and then turn the documents over to
the government. Those are the documents that end up being used in the case. It is
an interesting dynamic to think about when, years later, a former employee is a
defendant in a criminal case and the evidence being used against him was mar-
shaled by the company's lawyers. Yet that just all fits into this notion of corporate
cooperation, and how the process works.
The other basic aspect of an investigation involves interviewing witnesses. There
are a lot of significant issues that arise when the government deals with corporate
entities in the course of interviewing witnesses during an investigation. These are
the areas that are the subject of the most controversy. I could probably speak about
any single one of those issues for far longer than we have this morning, so I will
just really touch on some of the issues.
One issue is what to do about current employees. To be viewed as cooperative
under the Thompson Memo, companies essentially need to require all of their cur-
rent employees to submit to an interview with government investigators. If an em-
ployee refuses to submit to an interview, the government expects some sanction to
happen to that employee. That rarely happens. I never had a case as a prosecutor
where a current employee refused to speak to the government.
It is an interesting question what happens when an employee is pressured by the
company to speak with government investigators. Obviously, there are Fifth
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Amendment 6 issues, not to mention the ramifications of just submitting to an
interview with the government. If a person lies in an interview with the govern-
ment, that is a crime in and of itself; the person does not need to be under oath,
the person does not need to be in a grand jury. Lying to a prosecutor or an FBI
agent is a crime by itself, and you have Martha Stewart as perhaps the most famous
example of that fact."
A separate issue involves the representation of employees. Company counsel gen-
erally would prefer to represent as many employees as they can so they can remain
aware of what is being said to the government, but often there is a conflict of
interest involved in such multiple representations. Indeed, the whole premise of my
talk this morning demonstrates that there can be a conflict between the interests of
the company and the interests of an individual employee who is a potential wrong-
doer. On the one hand, you have a company trying to uncover fraud for the gov-
ernment and, on the other hand, you have an individual employee who perhaps is
the subject of an investigation and who, needless to say, does not want the govern-
ment to uncover any criminal acts.
Often several individuals at a company will need to get their own counsel. The
question obviously arises: who is going to pay for those lawyers? Individuals cannot
generally afford the sort of legal defense that is required in a big corporate fraud
investigation. For example, all the documents that I discussed earlier need to be
reviewed and that takes a lot of work. Often, companies agree to advance legal fees
for their employees, at least until a time when an employee is convicted of, or at
least charged with, a crime.
But, under the Thompson Memo, many government prosecutors discourage
companies from advancing legal fees to their employees who the government views
as wrongdoers. 8 Obviously, that is a significant hindrance to an individual's de-
fense. This issue is the subject of particular controversy and it is particularly timely
because in the KPMG tax fraud case, 9 which is pending in the Southern District of
New York. The judge in that case, Judge Lewis Kaplan, just ordered a hearing,
which is going to be held on May 8. This very issue is the subject of the hearing.
The defense has raised claims that their defense had been hindered because the
government basically pressured KPMG into cutting off legal fees for the individual
defendants and that infringed on their right to counsel." And the judge has or-
dered a hearing which, as far as I can tell, is really a hearing on the Thompson
Memo itself.2'
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).
18. See Thompson Memo, supra note 5, at § VI.
19. See Kara Scannell, KPMG Apologizes to Avert Charges, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2005, at A3.
20. Paul Davies, KPMG Case Sets Up Key Ruling on Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2006, at C1.
21. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Perhaps the biggest issue related to witnesses and corporate cooperation is the
issue of the attorney-client privilege. In many, if not all, corporate fraud cases, at a
very early stage, a lawyer for the company will interview some of the main players.
Often a company's general counsel will rush over to an executive and ask what
happened, or if outside counsel is brought in, they will quickly interview some of
the main players to determine what happened. Those conversations are all privi-
leged-but it is a privilege that belongs to the company, not to the individual.22
And inevitably, somewhere down the line in the investigation, the government will
ask what happened in that interview. The government will often request to see a
copy of the interview memo that was generated from that initial interview with
company employees. Perhaps the subject of the interview is someone the govern-
ment cannot talk to now because the person has invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights. So the government will say to the company: "Well, he spoke to the general
counsel the day the scandal was breaking, can we see that memo?" That request
puts the company in a very difficult position. In most jurisdictions, to produce that
memo would waive the company's privilege.
For the reasons I have described, companies want to help the government-they
want to be viewed as cooperative. In a situation like this, therefore, the company
may want to accede to the government's request for interview memos. But the
company will certainly want to preserve its attorney-client privilege. One common
step is to enter into a confidentiality agreement in an attempt to preserve the privi-
lege while cooperating with the government. Those agreements essentially provide
that the company will produce privileged materials to the government, but it is not
doing so because it wants to waive the privilege, but only because the government
is asking for privileged documents.
Courts are split as to whether those agreements, in fact, preserve the privilege. 3
There are many courts which essentially say, "too bad." The government is not a
party within the realm of the attorney-client privilege, so as soon as the company
produced privileged documents to the government, it waived the privilege. That
fact has significant ramifications, obviously, for the company, in particular when
the inevitable civil lawsuits follow, and the privilege has been waived.
The issue of government-forced waivers is probably the biggest hot button issue
right now because of what has been viewed as an assault by the government on the
attorney-client privilege. There were hearings in March of this year before a Con-
gressional committee on this topic where a coalition of defense counsel explained
22. See, e.g., Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 876 (Ariz. 1993).
23. Compare, e.g., In re Cardinal Health, No. C2 04 575 ALM, 2007 WL 495150 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007),
and In re Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 232 F.R.D. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (both preserving privilege), with In re
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l., Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. den., 127 S.Ct. 584 (2006), and United States
v. Reyes, No. CR 06-0556 CRB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94457 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006) (both finding waiver).
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the problems-the obvious problems-with putting corporations in a position
where they have to waive the privilege.24
Just a couple of weeks ago, the United States Sentencing Commission voted to
delete commentary from the Sentencing Guidelines that dealt with the waiver of
attorney-client privilege when evaluating a company's cooperation for sentencing
purposes.2" That step was definitely viewed as a victory for those who are defenders
of the privilege.26 Yet there is only so much to be made of that event because,
obviously, companies do not ever want to get to the point where they are subject to
the Sentencing Guidelines because once a company is there it has already been
convicted of a crime, and all the other ramifications that can occur often have
already happened. The idea behind cooperation is not to be charged at all. What
governs whether a company is charged is the Thompson Memo, and, at least for
now, the Thompson Memo still requires companies in some cases to waive the
privilege to be viewed as completely cooperative. As long as that is the case, then
companies are going to be under pressure in certain circumstances to waive the
privilege.
The next step in the process of a corporate fraud investigation is the charging
decision. That is one place where the company does not have any role to play, but
that does not mean that the company's role in the process or its requirement to
cooperate is over. Certainly, recent history has shown that a lot of these cases go to
trial. I had the good fortune of participating in three high profile corporate fraud
trials. I was one of the prosecutors for the two previous trials of Frank Quattrone,27
and I was one of the prosecutors in the trial of Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO of
WorldCom.2" As you might imagine, those trials were a lot of work and there were
a lot of issues that arose during trial. In general, a company's obligation under the
Thompson Memo to cooperate continues right through trial, and it continues in
much the same way that cooperation is required in the investigation stage.
With regard to witnesses, it is usually company counsel who helps coordinate
and accompany witnesses up to the prosecutor's office for a witness preparation.
With respect to documents, as you might imagine in a trial, things come up quickly
and prosecutors often need a document in a rush. Often, the easiest way to get a
particular document is to call the company's lawyers who usually have ready access
24. White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers, Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/l09th/26409.pdf.
25. Adele Nicholas, Reviving Privilege: Corporate Counsel Reignite the Debate Over Privilege as Sentencing
Commission Revises Rules, INSIDE COUNSEL, June 2006, at 18.
26. See Marcia Coyle & John Caher, Commission Votes to Delete Waiver Comments, N.Y.L.., April 12, 2006,
at 1 (discussing the U.S. Sentencing Commission's vote to delete language from the sentencing guidelines with
respect to attorney-client privilege waivers).
27. See United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d
304, 306 (2d Cir. 2005).
28. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2006).
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to all of the documents. After one phone call, prosecutors have the document that
they are looking for. Quite literally, companies do this to help the government
convict their former employees and companies do it without any hesitation be-
cause, at the end of the day, their willingness to help the government will affect
their own fate.
In some cases, the company's involvement in the prosecution even extends be-
yond the trial. It can extend to the financial components of sentencing individuals.
This does not happen as often but, in fact, it happened in the WorldCom case.
Because all this information is public, I can use WorldCom as an example of how a
corporation, in the spirit of cooperation, can get involved in the sentencing of an
individual defendant. After Mr. Ebbers was convicted of crimes, he owed restitu-
tion as part of his sentence.29 He had also been named as a defendant in a massive
class action lawsuit, which was also pending in the Southern District of New York.3"
What made this case complicated, but also presented an opportunity, was the debt
that Mr. Ebbers owed WorldCom. Mr. Ebbers had borrowed hundreds of millions
of dollars from WorldCom and now owed that money back.3' WorldCom had a
priority interest over some of Mr. Ebbers' most valuable assets.32 The government's
goal was to get the assets from Ebbers to the victims of the fraud.33 The government
succeeded in doing that, in part by bypassing WorldCom's priority interest and
getting most of the money to the victims. The ability to do this existed because of
the government's ongoing investigation of the corporate entity. The corporate en-
tity, even at that time, had not had its own fate resolved. Speaking from my per-
spective at the time as the prosecutor, it seemed that, because there was still the
possibility of a criminal prosecution of the entity, the company was willing essen-
tially to give up its right to some of Mr. Ebbers' assets in the name of getting more
cooperation credit with the government. In effect, it worked because, at the end of
the day, WorldCom and the government entered into a non-prosecution agree-
ment, which meant no criminal charges would be filed.34 There was certainly a time
when many claimed that, if there was ever a case crying out for criminal charges
against an entity, WorldCom was that entity. Yet in the end, in part through its
efforts to cooperate, it did not get charged.
29. See Gretchen Morgenson, Ebbers Set to Shed His Assets, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at C1 (discussing the
reparations deal between former WorldCom CEO Ebbers and U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York).
30. In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
31. Times Wire Services, Markets; J.P. Morgan to Pay $2 Billion in Settlement, L.A. TIMES, March 17, 2005,
at C4.
32. See Christopher Stern, Worldcom Pursuing Ebbers Assets for Sale, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2002, at El.
33. See Bloomberg News, An Appeals Court is Urged to Uphold Ebbers Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2005, at C3.
34. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D.N.Y., U.S. Enters Non-Prosecution Agreement with MCI
(Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/SeptemberO5/mcisettlementpr.pdf.
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In fact, in fraud cases, corporations today are rarely charged for crimes them-
selves. I think a primary reason for this fact is the enormous collateral conse-
quences that come from charging a corporate entity. Arthur Andersen is the
leading example of what can happen to a large company when the government
brings criminal charges against an entity and the effect that those charges can have
on completely innocent employees of a company who essentially lose their jobs.
Fundamentally, though, the government can look at the collateral consequences
and make decisions about whether to charge a company based largely on that im-
portant factor because cooperation is really not an issue anymore. Companies sim-
ply know what is expected of them when there is a criminal investigation. It is
almost not an issue; companies understand when there is an investigation that the
government expects them to cooperate completely and fully throughout the course
of that investigation.
As I have described the role of the corporate entity in corporate fraud prosecu-
tions, I've done so from the perspective of the prosecutor. And in particular, I've
described situations where the facts are fairly black and white-cases such as
WorldCom, where there really was not much serious debate about whether a fraud
had occurred that involved high level executives at the company. In cases like those,
there is only so much that the lawyers for the corporation can do. Their job is
basically to assist the company in portraying itself as a cooperative corporate entity
and to advocate that the government exercise its discretion not to bring criminal
charges against the company.
Of course, there are many situations-perhaps most situations-where the facts
and the law are not so clear and where it is not at all apparent that anyone has
committed a crime. It is in those situations where the attorneys for the company
may play a much more active role. Cooperation in the government's investigation
can still be important and useful to the company. For instance, cooperation in
complying with a subpoena or arranging witness interviews can prevent unwanted
disruption of the company's business. But in these more subtle cases, the attorneys
for the company may also play a substantial role in persuading the government
that, for example, no crime was committed at all, or that high level employees were
neither involved nor aware of the actions of lower level employees. As I've learned
since leaving the government and joining the defense bar, there is a particular skill
in simultaneously cooperating with the government and advocating for a particular
result.
I will give you just a few words on the future of where I think this is going and
whether corporate fraud prosecutions, and particularly the whole notion of corpo-
rate cooperation, is going to continue. I think the short answer is "yes" to both
questions. There certainly are going to be more corporate crimes. I do not think
there is any secret about that. It is not as if this is a new phenomenon. The really
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big cases, such as WorldCom5 and Enron, 6 obviously, stood out for their size, but
crimes are going to happen.
In my experience, I have seen different types of securities fraud crimes as the
economy changes. When the economy is doing well, I have seen the types of crimes
that prey on gullible investors-boiler room cases, private placement frauds, IPO
related crimes. Insider trading seems to be a popular crime when the markets are
high. When the economy is down, I have seen accounting fraud crimes. There is
pressure for companies to meet their numbers to keep Wall Street happy, and, in
down economic times, companies often cannot do that. So that is when I saw
accounting fraud crimes. That is precisely what happened in WorldCom, and that is
probably what happened in Enron as well. WorldCom is an easy example. It could
not meet Wall Street's expectations, so the participants in the fraud simply reported
lower expenses by altering the company's financial records, all in an effort to try to
fool the market and wait for the next economic cycle to come around. 7 So corpo-
rate crimes are going to happen, and prosecutors will always investigate those
crimes.
Will corporate cooperation almost always be part of these cases? I think the an-
swer is going to be yes. I would not be surprised to see some changes in the way the
system works. As I mentioned, there are some areas of particular controversy. I
think requiring attorney-client privilege waivers could certainly change. I think the
issue about fees is particularly controversial and certainly could change.
But, as a general matter, the government is going to consider a company's coop-
eration in making charging decisions and so companies are going to cooperate. If
we have learned anything from the last four years, it is that the government has had
a lot of success. With a couple of exceptions, just about all the major corporate
fraud cases have resulted in convictions. It is important to talk about the few high
profile cases where there were not convictions. The HealthSouth case"8 comes to
mind. Yes, there was one high-profile acquittal. However, look at that case from an
overall perspective-fourteen people pled guilty in that case and those are
convictions."
So there has been success in prosecuting these cases criminally and there has
been success financially. I saw a statistic recently-in 2005, the government col-
35. See Dionne Searcey et al., Ebbers is Sentenced to 25 Years for $11 Billion Worldcom Fraud, WALL ST. J.,
July 14, 2005, at Al.
36. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221 (2004).
37. Associated Press, Ex-Worldcom Accountant Says She Was Told to Falsify Entries, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2005, at C14.
38. See SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
39. See Kyle Whitmire, Executive Gets 5-Year Term in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at C13.
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lected over a billion dollars in settlements and judgments in civil fraud cases.4 ° That
is a success.
There were big problems in 2002 as all these scandals were unfolding. I think the
purpose behind creating the Corporate Fraud Task Force and the focus on corpo-
rate fraud cases was to restore confidence in the markets, and I think ultimately
that has happened a little bit. Perhaps the focus and pressure on companies in this
pursuit of corporate fraud cases has become a bit too intense and maybe there will
be some changes in some of the procedures the government follows in these cases.
But I think we will see these cases for the foreseeable future.
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